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This paper develops a sociological critique of the pre-eminence of humanism in dementia 
care policy and practice. Throughout the centuries, humanism has served as something of 
a double-edged sword in relation to the care and treatment of people living with 
progressive neurocognitive conditions.  On the one hand, humanism has provided an 
intellectual vehicle for recognizing people with dementia as sentient beings with inalienable 
human rights.  On the other hand, humanist approaches have relied upon and re-enforced 
normative understandings of what it means to be human; understandings that serve to 
position people with dementia as deficient.  Two posthumanist approaches to dementia 
care policy and practice are explored in this paper: transhumanism and critical 
posthumanism.  The former seeks, primarily, to use advances in 21st century technologies 
to eradicate dementia.  The latter seeks to de-centre anthropomorphic interpretations of 
what it means to be a person (with dementia), so as to create space for more diverse 
human-nonhuman relationships to emerge.  The paper concludes with some tentative 
suggestions as to what a critically posthumanist approach to dementia care policy and 
practice might look like, as we move closer towards the middle of the 21st century. 
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Introduction: dementia in the 21st century 
According to Alzheimer’s Disease International there are approximately 46.8 million people 
living with dementia in the world.  In line with an ageing global population, this figure is 
expected to almost triple to 131.5 million by the year 2050 (Alzheimer's Disease 
International 2015).  Addressing the economic, social and personal costs associated with 
dementia is increasingly constructed, within policy circles, as an international priority 
requiring multi-state solutions.  Pan-European dementia strategies are starting to be 
formulated, following Alzheimer Europe’s (2014) Glasgow Declaration.  At the G8 Summit 
on Dementia in 2013, the world’s richest nations committed themselves to working 
together to identify a cure or disease modifying therapy by the year 2025 (G8UK 2013).  
Parallel to the search for cures, developments in the use and sophistication of assistive 
technology (AT) in dementia care is expanding rapidly (Gibson, Newton et al. 2014).  
According to the British Assistive Technology Association (2012), the term assistive 
technology may refer to ‘any product or service that maintains or improves the ability of 
individuals with disabilities or impairments to communicate, learn and live independent, 
fulfilling and productive lives’. Several benefits have been associated with the use of AT in 
dementia, including improvements in quality of life, personalization of support services and 
the delays in the need for residential care (Bharucha et al. 2009).  The rise of AT in 
dementia care has been assisted by rapid advances in the sophistication of the digital 
world.  Developments such as Web 2.0, the Internet of Things, Big Data and Ubiquitous 
Computing have made it increasingly possible to deliver complex care and support 
interventions via digital platforms. 
 
With the growing sophistication in digital technologies has come an emerging aspiration 
that machines will be able to offer not just practical services to people with dementia, such 
as administering medications and locating people using Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
  
software, but emotional support and companionship as well.  The Japan-based company 
PARO, for example, (http://www.parorobots.com/) was one of the first to pilot the use of 
robots in dementia care settings.  PARO robots are digital devices designed to imitate 
baby seals and used to simulate the benefits of animal therapy.  Studies suggest these 
robots can significantly lower blood pressure amongst older people in care environments 
(Robinson, MacDonald and Broadbent 2015).  Following on from these initial explorations 
into the use of robotic companions in dementia, we are now starting to see the emergence 
of more sophisticated forms of artificial intelligence (AI) in care settings.  Pan-European 
projects such as CompanionAble and Mobiserv, for example, have sought to create robots 
for use within residential care settings that are capable of ‘inspiring interaction, and 
addressing more user needs in a trusted manner’ (Huijnen et al. 2011: 325).  Such 
developments have led to concerns that increasing automation may lead to a loss of 
quality and, more specifically, humanity within caring relationships.  This underlying 
sentiment was exemplified by Caroline Abrahams, Director of the charity Age UK, when 
she stated that however sophisticated digital technologies may become in the years and 
decades ahead there remains ‘no substitute for the human touch’ (Hudson 2013).   
 
In dementia care policy and practice, the term humanist has become synonymous with a 
broad-range of socially progressive, person-centred approaches to caring for people with 
progressive neurocognitive disorders in late-modern societies (Brooker 2003).  Humanist-
inspired theorists of care, such as Rogers (1967/2004), Kitwood (1997) and Sabat and 
Harré (1992) are widely credited as some of the early pioneers of this approach to 
dementia.  Their work, in particular, is credited with destabilizing biomedical assumptions 
that dementia is a disease of social death (see, for example, Sweeting and Gilhooly 1997).  
Indeed, their success has been such that, since the late 1990s, the task of recognizing the 
humanity of people with dementia has moved centre-stage within the policy landscapes, to 
  
the extent that failing to acknowledge the ‘standing or status’ (Kitwood 1997) of people 
with dementia as unique individuals with inalienable human rights would today be virtually 
un-thinkable.  This paper, however, offers a critical discussion of the pre-eminence given 
to the role of humans and humanity in dementia care.  Humanism, it is argued, has proved 
to be something of a double-edged sword when it comes to the care of people living with 
progressive neurocognitive conditions; on the one hand, recognizing people with dementia 
as beings with inherent value whilst, on the other hand, retaining normative 
understandings of what it means to be human that serve to perpetuate discrimination 
against people living with neurocognitive disease. 
 
Humanism & dementia: A double-edged sword 
Whilst associated predominantly with late twentieth century frameworks, humanism has 
been the modus operandi for conceptualizing dementia since the term (dementia) was first 
anchored (Moscovici 1984) within the psychiatric community by alienists such as Philippe 
Pinel (1745-1826). Published just two years after the death of one of the founding fathers 
of rational humanism (Immanuel Kant), Pinel’s (1806) Treatise on Insanity offered the first 
nosology of dementia, the symptoms of which he described thus: 
 
‘In dementia, there is no judgement either true or false. The ideas appear to be 
insulated and to rise one after the other without connection, the faculty of 
association being destroyed.’ 
(Pinel 1806: 164) 
This, arguably, is one of the first scientific representations of dementia as social death, in 
that it defines dementia as the very absence of what Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and 
Descartes (1596-1650) viewed as the primary attribute of the human condition, namely 
reason.  Whilst Pinel’s approach may be seen as the intellectual keystone of what Kitwood 
  
(1997) referred to as the standard paradigm in dementia, it is an approach created very 
much from within the humanist tradition.  Pinel was, after all, a  pioneer of the moral 
treatment school of psychiatry, which emphasised the importance of compassion, 
sanctuary and asylum for people living with mental disorders (see, for example, Scull 
1979).  This practice that Pinel helped to establish - of promoting socially progressive 
approaches to the care of people with dementia whilst, at the same time, retaining 
normative assumptions to what it means to be human - has characterised humanist 
approaches to dementia ever since.  We can see it, for example, in the development of 
one of the principle frameworks currently underpinning dementia care policy in the UK - 
the Social Citizenship approach. 
 
Developed, in part, in response to the Personhood framework, the social citizenship model 
is anchored less in humanist metaphysical philosophy and more within the language of 
human rights, as it emerged across Europe during the latter stages of the Second World 
War (see, for example, Bartlett and O'Connor 2007, 2010).  In essence, the concept of 
social citizenship is based on the belief that, in addition to legal and political rights, citizens 
must be acknowledged as having social rights.  Social rights were first articulated by the 
welfare theorist TH Marshall thus: 
 
‘By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security, to the right to share to the full in the social heritage 
and to live the civilised life according to the standards prevailing in society.’ 
 
(Marshall 1950/2009: 149) 
 
  
Since the end of WWII, the rights of all citizens to be involved - as full and equal 
participants - in social, economic and cultural life has become enshrined in several 
international human rights declarations, most notably the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (United Nations 1966) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(United Nations 2006). These declarations have proved pivotal in shaping contemporary 
dementia policy in the UK; through, for example, the Charter of Rights for People with 
Dementia and their Carers in Scotland (Cross-Party Group on Alzheimer's 2009).  Yet, if 
we go back to the original post-war formulations of social rights, we can see that notions of 
social rights were frequently accompanied by normative beliefs as to what constitutes a 
desirable citizen.  Although it is not widely recognized in debates around social citizenship, 
several of the early advocates of social rights, including those who pioneered universal 
welfare provision in the UK, were members of the Eugenics Society i who advocated the 
compulsory sterilization of members of society who found themselves in need of State 
protection.  As Sir William Beveridge, author of the now seminal Beveridge Report in the 
UK argued: 
 
 ‘…those men who through general defects are unable to fill such a whole place in 
industry are to be recognized as unemployable. They must become the 
acknowledged dependents of the state... but with complete and permanent loss of 
all citizen rights including not only the franchise, but civil freedom and fatherhood.’ 
(Beveridge 1906: 327 cited in Lund 2002: 80) 
 
Citizenship approaches to social justice, in short, reflect something of a mixed history, as 
advocates of universalism frequently viewed this approach as compatible with the 
expectation that less desirable humans should be, in the words of Richard Titmuss, 
  
‘relieved of the burden of their fertility’ (Titmuss 1944: 57).  Indeed - and as Bartlett and 
O’Connor (2010) acknowledge - there remain tensions within the application of citizenship-
based thinking to contemporary dementia care policy and practice, such as how notions of 
social rights sit alongside companion concepts, like civic responsibility, when applied to 
people with progressive neurocognitive conditions.   
 
There are reasons why humanist approaches to dementia have fallen into this intellectual 
trap; he principal of which is that advocates of humanism in dementia have largely failed to 
recognize the distinction, at the conceptual level, between humanism as a paradigm (Kuhn 
1962) and humanism as part of the modern episteme (Foucault 1970).  Whilst the former 
represents a conscious and unstable body of thought, prone to overt questioning and de-
stabilization, the latter exists at the level of sub-conscious thought and has proved 
remarkably resilient to change.   As episteme, humanism may be understood as a central 
element within modern thinking, with its origins dating back to the Renaissance period of 
14th century Europe and to the premise that Man, as opposed to God, is the fulcrum of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1970).  Thus, to understand humanism in dementia as pertaining 
solely to the work of latter-day theorists such as Kitwood (1997) and Rodgers (1967/2004) 
obscures and leaves unchallenged a set of ontological principles (that humans exist 
objectively and that possess objective properties),  the validity of which is neither pre-
determined nor self-evident.  To paraphrase Moscovici (1984: 13) when it comes to the 
human, the dementia care community has become ‘like the artist, who bows before down 
before the statue he has sculpted and worships it as a God’. 
 
Emphasizing the distinction between humanism as a paradigm and humanism as a part of 
the modern episteme is not an exercise in academic pedantry - although I appreciate it 
may seem so.  Rather, it is essential to understanding how socially progressive 
  
approaches to caring for people with dementia have, inadvertently, fallen into the trap of 
perpetuating social inequality.  By appealing to normative concepts such as the human, 
these approaches serve to re-enforce a hierarchical system of classification in which 
sentient beings are ordered according to the extent to which they do, or do not, 
approximate to the human ideal.  As Wolfe argues: 
 
‘[M]ost of us would probably agree that … people with disabilities deserve to be treated 
with respect and equality.  But … the philosophical and theoretical frameworks used by 
humanism to try and make good on those commitments reproduce the very kind of 
normative subjectivity - a specific concept of the human - that grounds discrimination 
against … the disabled in the first place.’  
(Wolfe 2010: xvi-xvii) 
 
In short, humanism in dementia is not - as is often presented - a magic bullet capable of 
addressing any-and-all instances of oppression and discrimination that people with 
dementia encounter on a daily basis.  Rather, concepts such as the human, the individual 
and the citizen are highly normative and, as such, are ‘instrumental to practices of 
exclusion and discrimination’ (Braidotti 2013: 26).  If we are to avoid perpetuating 
discrimination in the name of social inclusion, there is a need to move beyond humanism 
as the sole framework for conceptualizing care. 
 
Beyond humanism: Transhumanist & critically posthumanist frameworks 
Posthumanism in social science can be broadly divided into two camps: transhumanism 
and critical posthumanism; although authors such as Ferrando (2013) advocate for a more 
multi-faceted nomenclature (transhumanism, posthumanism, antihumanism, 
metahumanism and new materialisms).  In essence, transhumanism seeks to use 
  
developments in 21st century technology, in particular advances in computing, genetics 
and nanotechnology, as vehicles for self-directed evolution.  Critical posthumanism, in 
contrast, draws on developments in 21st century technologies to question and destabilise 
systems of classification that are based on the binary distinction between human and 
nonhuman.  This section reviews both approaches and considers their relevance to 
contemporary dementia care policy and practice. 
 
Transhumanism, as defined by Bostrom (2005: 3) is ‘an interdisciplinary approach to 
understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the 
human organism opened up by the advancement of technology.’  From this perspective, 
Bostrom argues, the human is a work in progress rather than an essential or un-
changeable entity.  Through developments in technology, humans will eventually be able 
to transcend the limitations of their organic bodies, thus rendering human suffering, ageing 
and even death itself obsolete.  Whilst this may sound like the stuff of science fiction, 
contemporary developments in digital-neural interfacing are making it increasingly possible 
to realize transhumanist values within the everyday world.  Cochlear implants, for example 
– digital devices designed to replace damaged parts of the inner ear by transmitting digital 
signals directly to the brain - are used by over 324,000 people globally (National Institute 
of Deafness and Other Communication Disorders 2015).  In 2003, biomedical engineer 
Theadore Berger developed the world’s first brain prosthesis; a computer chip designed to 
replace cognitive functions executed by the hippocampus, which is an area of the brain 
where memory, mood and self-awareness are all understood to reside (Berger et al. 
2011).  According to Hughes (2004), these emerging technological capabilities are 
provoking a fundamental reconfiguration of human societies.  The ability to download and 
recover memories for example, will, James argues, make conventional ethical, legal and 
philosophical frameworks of Personhood untenable.  Would, for example, a recovered set 
  
of memories downloaded into a new material body constitute a new, or a pre-existing, 
person?  How would associated frameworks, such as citizenship and individual identity be 
applied to this (new) person?  As James (2004: 85) argues: 
 
‘When we get to the point where neurological functions can be controlled, designed, 
cloned, shared, sold and turned on and off, the fact that the continuous, 
autonomous self is an illusion will become more obvious.’ 
 
Arguments such as these represent a clear and present threat to established (humanist) 
frameworks for dementia care, which espouse respect for autonomy and individuality as 
some of highest ethical principles underpinning caring relationships; see, for example, 
Brooker (2007).  Transhumanist visions of a dementia-free posthuman age are 
controversial to say the least, and the transhumanist project has been described by writers 
such as Fukuyama (2003, 2004) as one of the world’s most dangerous ideas.  And yet, as 
I have argued previously (see Author A), questioning the essential truth of the individual, 
autonomous self, enjoys a rich history within social theory.  As Geertz (1975) observed, 
the notion of the individual as a single, discrete, autonomous entity is somewhat peculiar 
to Western societies and is not lionized to the same extent in other, majority world 
cultures.  In this respect, the fact that new technological affordances may be prompting us 
to revisit hitherto accepted notions of what it means to be human can simply be seen as an 
extension of a longer intellectual tradition.  Whilst this is the case, concerns that 
transhumanism, if realized, will lead to the development of new social hierarchies (for 
example, sub-humans, humans, transhumans and humans+ii), has led to calls from within 
the humanities and social sciences for a new counter-science to transhumanism rooted in 
humanist philosophy; see for example, Habermas (2003) and Kompridis (2009).  Rather 
than being a radical departure from the humanist tradition, however, transhumanism is 
  
rooted in rational humanism.  As Bostrom (2005) argues, the idea of using science to aid 
human progress dates back to the writings of key humanists such as Julien Offray de La 
Mettrie (1709-1751) and Friedrich Neitzsche (1844-1900), amongst others.  Hence, 
returning to humanism as a counter-science to the social, moral and philosophical 
challenges posed by the transhumanist project seems a curious, and ultimately ill-fated, 
enterprise for dementia policy.  For an effective counter science to transhumanism to be 
developed, it must originate from within the posthuman tradition. 
 
The second theoretical perspective then (critical posthumanism), represents a solid 
foundation upon which to build a more socially-inclusive approach to dementia as well as a 
counter science to transhumanism.  According to Badmington (2000) and Braidotti (2013), 
critical posthumanism can be understood as a broad intellectual tradition characterized by 
its critical exploration of Man as a socially constructed entity.  This draws on several 
intellectual perspectives including Marxism, psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and 
postmodernism, where the unifying goal involves critiquing normative assumptions and 
regulatory frameworks that exist within humanist modes of thought.  In this respect, and as 
Miah (2007: 2) argues: 
 
‘[T]he ‘post’ of posthumanism need not imply the absence of humanity or moving 
beyond it in some biological or evolutionary manner. Rather, the starting point 
should be an attempt to understand what has been omitted from an anthropocentric 
worldview, which includes coming to terms with how the Enlightenment centring of 
humanity has been revealed as inadequate.’ 
 
One of the vehicles through which critical posthumanism has sought to de-centre the 
human (and humanity) is through the development of new ways of conceptualizing what it 
  
means to be a person; ways in which hierarchical orderings based on binary distinctions 
(man-woman, natural-artificial, human-nonhuman) are rendered obsolete.  As Hayles 
(1999) argues, one of the most successful of such imaginaries is that of the cyborg.  The 
concept of the cyborg (cybernetic organism) was first developed in the early 1960s by 
Manfred Clynes and Nathan Clyne, as a thought experiment intended to advance space 
exploration, whereby humans could endure prolonged periods in space through reliance 
on computer-based technologies (Clark, 2003). Whilst the concept has undergone many 
variations since the 1960s, the basic notion that a cyborg is as a person consisting of both 
organic and non-organic matter remains.  In what is now widely regarded as a seminal 
text, Haraway (1991/2007) draws on the concept of the cyborg in a deliberately 
provocative way to outline a socialist feminist manifesto for social change.  She argues 
that, rather than thinking of ourselves as discrete, unified, organic human beings,  ’we are 
all chimeras, theorised and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism’ (Haraway 
1991/2007: 34). Embracing this hybridity, Haraway argues, can lead us to a world in which 
‘people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of 
permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints’ (Haraway 1991/2007: 38).  
 
Whilst the cyborg is, for Haraway, a means of dissolving binary distinctions that serve to 
perpetuate inequality and social division, it is an approach to personhood that is unlikely to 
take hold within policy and practice-based dementia care communities.  This is due 
primarily to its association with notions of automata and depersonalization.  An alternative, 
yet equally liberating representation of personhood - and one more appropriate for 
dementia care settings - is that of the symbiont. 
 
From the Greek συμβίωσις, symbiosis in its most elementary sense means living together.  
The concept was first used, within biology, to describe a union between organisms based 
  
on mutually benefit, yet the notion of sustained existence through mutual interdependence 
was developed during the 17th century to describe productive patterns of community life 
(Online Etymology Dictionary 2015).  Through the work of social theorists such as 
Proudhoun (1890/1970) and Kropotkin (1902/1972), the concept of symbiosis became 
positioned as one of the key ingredients for social life.  As a person then, a symbiont is a 
being that has achieved a state of mutually beneficial co-existence with other entities, 
including entities that may be classified as beyond human. Symbionts, by definition, are 
not autonomous individuals but are defined through their mutual interdependence with 
other organic and non-organic beings.  For symbionts, mutualism (as opposed to 
individualism) is the key principle upon which person-centred models of care are to be 
based.  Symbionts thrive on direct democracy, voluntary engagement and the sharing of 
resources within communities. 
 
Where symbiosis takes on a distinctly posthuman element in contemporary dementia care, 
is the inclusion of mechanised agents within patterns of mutual co-existence.  The notion 
of human-machine symbiosis was first proposed by Licklider (1960: 6), who predicted that 
‘the contributions of human operators and equipment will blend together so completely in 
many operations that it will be difficult to separate them neatly in analysis.’  In other words, 
in the near future it will become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the agency of 
humans and the agency of machines.  Over half a century on from Licker’s prediction, 
rapid developments in Big Data and the ability of machines to learn through trail-and-error 
based algorithms, are indeed, according to some authors, increasingly blurring the lines 
between human and nonhuman forms of agency (Knox 2014).   
 
Towards a critically posthumanist approach to dementia care 
  
Moore’s law predicts that computing power will double every 18 months to two years, 
leading Vinge (1993) to hypothesise a point in the 21st century, known as the Singularity, 
when humans will possess inferior levels of intelligence to that of machines.  According to 
Ray Kurzweil, Director of Engineering at the internet giant Google, this historical tipping 
point could be as near as the year 2045 (Kurzweil 2045); in other words, five years before 
the global prevalence of dementia is expected to have tripled from current estimates.  How 
then, in an era of rapid technological change, might dementia care adapt so as to 
embrace, as opposed to resist, this new technological era? 
 
We are perhaps decades away from realizing the kinds of machine-human symbiosis that 
were first hypothesized by Licklider (1960).  Yet, the incorporation of machine intelligence 
within caring relationships is likely to require more than technological innovation.  It will 
require a willingness to question and problematize the underlying assumptions upon which 
contemporary models of care are based.  ‘No substitute for human touch’ implies that, 
however sophisticated machines become, they will never be able to replicate the types of 
caring relationships that are produced through human-human interactions. Yet appealing 
to humanity is a dangerous position, as it tends to reflect implicit, normative assumptions 
of what it means to be human; assumptions that serve to position people with dementia as 
deficient to begin with. If we are to realize fully the potential of 21st century technologies to 
promote social inclusion, there needs to be recognition that humanism is not the answer to 
all deficiencies in the care and treatment of people with neurocognitive impairments.  
Indeed, in some respects, humans and humanism are, themselves, part of the problem.  
As recent studies have helped to highlight, the abuse and neglect of older people is 
alarmingly widespread throughout the UK and is a phenomenon perpetuated entirely by 
humans (Biggs et al. 2009, Alzheimer’s Society 2011) as, indeed, is the global problem of 
stigma in dementia F(Alzheimer’s Disease International 2012).  Socially progressive 
  
approaches to dementia - be it the moral psychiatry of the 19th century or the social 
citizenship of the early 21st century - fail to address deep-seated social inequalities when 
they retain the conceptual bifurcation of persons deemed to be with mind (cum mentia) 
and without mind (dementia).  These divisions remain rooted in our language structures 
and our unconscious thought, despite the proliferation of policy documents espousing the 
human rights of people with dementia to live with dignity, respect, social inclusion and 
equal protection under the law.   
 
How then, can we develop an alternative to humanist-inspired frameworks for dementia 
care?  The first step, following Miah (2007), involves de-centering the human within the 
care assemblage.  Anthropocentric notions, like putting the individual at the centre of care, 
need to be replaced with representations of personhood that enable a greater diversity of 
thought and practice to emerge.  One approach, as highlighted in the previous section, is 
to replace the concept of the individual in dementia with that of the symbiont.  Contrary to 
existing models of care, which reflect the belief that there is no substitute for human touch, 
the idea that symbionts living with progressive neurocognitive disorders can and should 
form productive, meaningful, and mutually beneficial relationships with machines (as well 
as other nonhuman beings) is central to the co-production of high quality caring 
relationships.  Hence, rather than something to be feared, the development of robotic 
prototypes, such as those developed through the Mobiserv and CompanionAble projects, 
are providing some of the earliest insights into what a critically posthumanist approach to 
dementia care might look like.  In science fiction also, we are starting to imagine a world in 
which machines can build friendships and aid decision-making in dementia; as illustrated, 
for example, in the 2013 film Robert and Frank.  This trend in re-imagining is only likely to 
increase in the years and decades ahead, as we approach the middle of the twentieth 
century and when the Digitally Native (Prensky 2001) generations start entering the third 
  
and fourth stages of the lifecourse.  As this happens, there will be an increasing need to 
revisit some of the assumptions currently made about people with dementia’s 
understanding of, skills in, and use of digital technologies.   The idea, for example, of 
placing Power of Attorney in the hands of an algorithm, however sophisticated it may be, is 
likely to be an idea that would fill many contemporary commentators with fear, suspicion 
and derision.  Yet, how many Digital Natives may be perfectly happy to draw on the 
support of a mechanized companion in later life, is a question yet to be fully formulated, let 
alone explored empirically. 
 
Summary remarks 
Moving beyond humanist approaches to dementia will require more than technological 
innovation.  It will require significant changes in the underlying ways in which we think 
about personhood and neurocognitive disease.  Rather than seeking to eradicate 
dementia through technologically driven, self-directed evolution (and aspect of 
transhumanist thought), critical posthumanism seeks to develop new ways of thinking 
about persons and personhood in ways that address humanism’s in-built tendencies to 
order sentient beings hierarchically, according to their approximation to the human ideal.  
In this respect, critical posthumanism as a branch of contemporary social theory has much 
to offer dementia care.  To realize this potential, however, we need to first problematize 
some of the unquestioned ‘truths’ that surround this area of practice; in particular, the 
implicit and unquestioned assumption that there is no substitute for human touch. 
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Endnotes 
i An organisation established by Sir Francis Galton with the stated aim of improving the 
human race through natural selection. 
ii This typology is based on the science fiction writer David Simpson’s posthuman series. 
